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Much of Adolf Grunbaum’s work on psychoanalytic theory over the years has been 
concerned with causal claims. These can be claims either about the aetiology of psychic 
disorders or about the efficacy of various aspects of psychoanalytic treatment; and they 
can be either singular causal claims intended to describe a single individual, such as 
“Anna O’s neurotic symptoms were cured by Breuer’s inducement of cathartic recall,”2 
or generic claims meant to be true in general (what I call “causal laws”), like “The adult 
male disposition of castration anxiety is attributable to oedipal childhood events prior to 
age 6”.3 
 
                                                
I am here going to discuss singular causal claims and how to support them. Grunbaum 
and I both4, I gather, accept what is conventionally regarded as best practice in so-called 
“quasi-experiments” – so long as all the precautions are tended to. I have in mind here 
methods, like pretest-postest control group designs, Solomon four groups designs, simple 
ANOVA, or Latin square designs. 
 
In all these cases we look for a difference in the outcome between when the individual is 
“treated” with the cause and when not. The methods in my list are increasingly difficult 
to apply, and correlatively, increasingly more powerful. The simpler designs are more apt 
to go astray because they are less good at guarding against reasons for the difference in 
outcome other than the treatment. This is the same idea that Grunbaum uses in his 
criticisms of many of the psychoanalytic claims about individual etiologies: the reasons 
employed in arriving at a causal conclusion are not good enough to ensure that the 
putative cause made a difference to the outcome.  
 
I do not agree with Grunbaums’s insistence that the cause must make a difference in the 
single case. The cause must contribute to the effect. But that is no guarantee that it will 
make a difference. The idea that it must make a difference lies at the core of 
counterfactual accounts of causality; and these notoriously give wrong verdicts in cases 
 
1 Research for this paper was aided by the AHRB project, Causality: Metaphysics and Methods, and was 
supported by a grant from the Latsis Foundation. I would like to thank both. I first became seized with the 
importance and excitement of philosophy of science from Adolf Grunbaum as well as with a respect for 
careful thought and serious dialogue, which I am afraid I have never been able to emulate sufficiently; and I 
am deeply grateful to him, as well as for his support and friendship over many years.  
2 Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, 1993, 
Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., p. 238ff. 
3 Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, 1993, 
Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., p.176. 
4 Cf. Grunbaum’s endorsement that “the A-B-A does succeed in discrediting spontaneous remission”. 
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. 1993, 
Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc. p.237. 
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of preemption. The President would nevertheless have died if the trainee assassin had not 
fired because in that case the experienced assassin standing beside the trainee would have 
shot.  
 
There are of course ways to adjust our semantics for either counterfactuals or causal 
claims to deal with cases of preemption. For instance, withdraw the claim that causes 
make a difference to their effects and replace it by a two-stage analysis. One factor causes 
another if there is a chain of causal dependence between the cause and the effect, where 
the counterfactual connection does hold for each link. We may dispute whether this tactic 
does the job since it depends on the empirical hypothesis that between a cause and its 
effect there is always a chain of events where each is so close – ‘close enough’ – to the 
next that preemption is impossible and the first will make a difference to the second. But 
whether it works or not, it does not rescue the claim that a cause must make a difference 
to its effect but rather gives up on it. I maintain that that is all to the good. For the claim 
mistakes a ‘sometimes’ test, or symptom, of causation for a necessary condition: 
‘sometimes’, perhaps often, causes contribute to their effects in such a way as to make a 
difference. But it is not necessary that they do so.   
 
Even should we adopt the assumption that causes make a difference we still face 
enormous difficulties in putting it to use. That will be my topic here. How can we tell 
whether one factor makes a difference or not to another, outside of one of the really good 
single case designs? Grunbaum offers a necessary condition, which I will describe in a 
moment. A necessary condition can of course rule out singular causal claims, even 
though it is not enough to admit them. Here I am more cautious even than Grunbaum. I 
do not know of any general criteria I am happy with that will rule out singular claims as 
false, let alone some criteria that will rule them in as true. Outside of a good quasi-
experiment, unless we are in a situation where we have a great deal of background 
knowledge to deploy and are not relying on general criteria (i.e., on ones that are valid in 
every case),5 the verdict must be left open. 
 
The problem of ‘other reasons’ for a positive outcome is very familiar in the case of 
treatments. The patient got better, but was it the treatment that did it as opposed to 
‘spontaneous remission’? Lots of conditions just do go away ‘on their own’. Or might it 
instead be a ‘placebo effect’ – the result of confidence and expectation that does not 
depend on the specific character of the treatment but might accompany any treatment? 6 
These are just the problems Grunbaum raises. For instance, Anna O, it seemed, lost her 
neurotic symptoms under Breuer’s treatment of cathartic recall. But what convincing 
reason is there to think the treatment caused the relief?7 
                                                 
5 I do not mean here that the criterion can actually be applied in every case, but rather that its deliverances 
are reliable universally if properly applied. 
6 To be more careful, we should follow Grunbaum’s definition: “I speak of a treatment Gain as a placebo 
effect with respect to a particular target disorder, therapeutic theory, and type of patient, just when that 
positive effect is produced by treatment factors other than those designated as the efficacious ones by the 
therapeutic theory.” Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of 
Psychoanalysis. 1993, Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., p. 189. 
7 Cf. Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. 
1993, Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., p 237ff. 
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Similarly for claims about the sources of an individual patient’s neuroses. Was the 
Ratman’s obsession provoked by his encounter with the Czech captain? Was its base 
cause certain repressed (or imagined) childhood experiences? Was Anna O’s inability to 
drink water due to her disgust at seeing a dog lapping water from a friend’s glass? Much 
of the argument in favor of these hypotheses depends, Grunbaum notes, on “thematic 
affinities”; and thematic affinities are not enough! 
 
In explaining why thematic affinities are not enough, Grunbaum considers a couple of 
analogies. He asks what licenses a tourist to make the causal inference that shapes in the 
sand that look very much like human footprints were caused by human feet walking 
there. He says 
 
To draw the inference, the tourist avails himself of a crucial piece of additional 
information […] footlike beach formations in the sand never or hardly ever result 
from the mere collocation of sand particles under the action of air, such as gusts 
of wind. Indeed, the additional evidence is that, within the class of beaches, the 
incursion of a pedestrian onto the beach makes the difference between the absence 
and presence of the footlike formations.8 
 
He also contrasts two dreams about houses. The first is Agnes’s dream of a house that 
looks just like Frank Lloyd Wright’s Falling Water. She has the dream just after she has 
visited it for the first time, never having seen or heard about it before then. The second is 
his own dream about houses after a typical day on which he has passed a lot of houses. In 
the first we have reason to postulate a causal connection because “Agnes’s visit made a 
difference to her having that dream.”9 The contrary is the case with Grunbaum’s own 
dream: 
 
To put it more precisely, seeing a house on the day before a dream does not divide 
the class of the day’s waking experiences on the prior days into two subclasses, 
such that the probabilities (or frequencies) of the appearance of a house in the 
next dream differ as between the two subclasses. On the other hand, in Agnes’s 
life, such a division does occur, with ensuing different probabilities of dreaming 
about that house.10 
 
More Generally 
 
If X is to be causally relevant to Y in reference class C, X must partition C into 
two subclasses in which the probabilities or incidences of Y are different from one 
another.11  
 
                                                 
8 “‘Meaning’ Connections and Causal Connections in the Human Sciences”, Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association. 38, 1990, pp. 559-577, p. 568. 
9 Ibid., p. 570. 
10 Ibid., p. 570. 
11 Ibid., p. 571. 
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He repeats this general demand verbatim in his 1992 “Postscript” to his criticism of the 
way the case study method is used in psychoanalysis in Validation…; and he notes there 
that this criterion is defended by Wesley Salmon in his work on statistical relevance as a 
mark of causation. It is this condition I want to focus on. 
 
The first thing I want to note is that this is, as I said, offered as a necessary condition. 
Showing that X increases the probability of Y in the right reference class C shows that X 
can cause Y; on my account of causal laws12 it even shows that some individual X’s do 
cause Y’s in C. But that does not show that for the case at hand X did cause Y. A lot of 
other factors that can cause Y might be present as well and they might have been 
responsible for Y. Or Y might have, in a sense, had no cause at all, as in the examples of 
spontaneous remission – Y’s occurrence was the outcome of the natural development of 
the system. The requisite increase in probability of Y on X is not enough to show that 
Grunbaum’s own condition – that X made a difference to Y in the case at hand – is met.  
 
This might be overlooked if we focus only on the two analogues Grunbaum mentions. 
For in each case the other kinds of factors that raise the probability of the effect are 
extremely unlikely to have occurred. For instance, the prints in the sand could be made 
by a hand-held mold as part of an elaborate hoax, or a line of children in a strange sand 
castle competition. If these had occurred, then more needs to be done to show that the 
putative cause is really the one that brought about the effect (or, where the effect is 
cumulative, that it contributed). 
 
Let us turn now to the condition itself. I have been reading this in the usual way, as a 
condition intended to bear immediately on generic causal claims, not singular ones, on 
what I call “causal laws”. My paradigms are “Aspirins relieve headaches” and “Inverting 
and sparking a population of atoms causes lasing.” For generic claims, I want to argue, 
the condition may be a sufficient condition, but it is not necessary. 
 
Whether it will be a sufficient condition in a reference class depends very much on what 
that reference class is like. We are all familiar with the problem of spurious correlation. 
One factor raises the probability of a second, but it does not cause it. Rather, they are 
both joint effects of a common cause. A common tactic here is to demand reference 
classes in which all common causes are held fixed. But that is not enough. Even in a 
reference class like that, if the members of the class are also preselected for a given 
effect, causes of that effect can be correlated or anti-correlated, without causing each 
other. Also, if causes can act purely probabilistically, then joint of effects of a common 
cause can be correlated even in a population where the cause is held fixed. There are also 
those strange quantum mechanical cases, where distant factors are correlated even – so 
the standard story goes – without any causal explanation.  
 
I think the best we can do here is to employ a process of elimination. Causes can increase 
the probability of their effects. But there are also many other possible explanations for 
such an increase in probability. If we have a reference class in which all other 
                                                 
12 Cf. N Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement, 1989, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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explanations for the increase in probability have been eliminated, then it must be due to 
the fact that the one factor causes the other. 
 
Next, why do I maintain that the condition is not necessary? There are two well-known 
reasons. For the first, let us consider a version of Wesley Salmon’s example,13 which was 
central to his work on statistical relevance that Grunbaum cites. We consider an 
experimental situation in which by the random flip of a fair coin either a strong 
radioactive element, E1, or a weak one, E2, will be introduced into an empty box. We 
look for the presence of a radioactive particle, α, later. The probability that E1 produces 
an α particle in the designated time is .9; for E2, the probability of α is .1. Since the 
probability is .5 for either element to be in the box, the overall probability for α is .5. 
Notice that the probability of α with E2 in the box is lower than this. But when E2 is in 
the box and an α particle appears, it is certainly E2 that causes it. This led Salmon to 
claim that causes may reduce the probability of their effects as well as raising it.  
 
A slight change in the example leads to a more radical conclusion, however. Imagine we 
have available a large number of different radioactive elements; two – E3 and E4 – 
happen to have the same probability for producing α particles. Repeat the experiment 
now with E3 and E4. If E3 is in the box when an α particle appears, definitely E3 causes it 
and similarly with E4. Yet in this case the probability stays the same. The cause makes no 
difference to the probability of the effect.  
 
Salmon’s example is a case of Simpson’s paradox, which I rediscovered years ago in 
criticizing Patrick Suppes’s use of increase in probability as a necessary condition for 
causality.14 Suppose we partition a population into cells according to different values of a 
variable Z. Then X can increase the probability of Y in every cell of the partition and yet 
not do so in the population as a whole. In order for this to happen X and Y must be 
probabilistically dependent on Z. In my amended version of Salmon’s example X = 
radioactive element 1, Y = presence of decay particle, and Z = presence of radioactive 
element 2. X increases the probability of Y given Z and it also increases it given –Z; but 
it does not do so in the population as a whole. That is because, as we have seen, the 
presence of the one element is correlated with the absence of the other. 
 
One proposal conventionally offered in solution to this problem is the one I described 
above in talking about sufficient conditions for causal claims: insist that the reference 
class for testing “X causes Y” should be homogeneous with respect to all other causes of 
Y other than X. In a reference class like that, nothing should be correlated (or, so it is 
supposed) with X, and hence Simpson’s paradox cannot make problems. I do not know 
what Grunbaum thinks of this solution. He might have intended this as a constraint on the 
reference class C all along. Probably he does discuss this somewhere that I missed. Here 
is a remark I did find, in a discussion of a similar problem in a singular case: 
                                                 
13 W Salmon, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, 1971, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
14 N Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie, 1983, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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But it is utterly chimerical to predicate a research design on a situation in which 
two people differ only with respect to the property that the investigator 
conjecturally deems relevant to the outcome!15 
 
Of course the quote only says that we will not be likely to ensure such a research design; 
it does not tell us whether our condition is a necessary condition if we did have such a 
design. 
 
 
Besides the strategy of demanding an increase in probability only in reference classes that 
are homogeneous with respect to all other causal factors, there is a second strategy to deal 
with Simpson’s paradox – simply deny the phenomenon. I suppose this is not a crazy 
proposal because very clever people like Clark Glymour, Peter Spirtes, Judea Pearl and a 
host of followers insist on it. It is a major assumption in the currently fashionable Bayes-
nets methods for causal discovery and causal inference. The chief argument offered in its 
support is one about mathematical spaces. Notice that in the Salmon example, only some 
specific arrangements of probabilities will make P(Y/X) = P(Y/-X). This is characteristic 
of Simpson’s paradox situations. I can construct millions of them, but always one has to 
get the numbers to balance out correctly. This is reflected in a theorem: if you put a 
Lebesgue measure over n-tuples of numbers, the set of n-tuples that gives rise to 
Simpson’s paradox has measure zero. From this it is concluded that these situations never 
occur in nature. Not only is this a bad inference; the conclusion seems palpably untrue as 
well. I shall return briefly to this point in a moment. 
 
There is a second well-known reason why a cause may not increase the probability of its 
effect: a particular cause may itself have different capacities with respect to the same 
effect and these capacities may balance out. This is especially likely to happen in systems 
we design ourselves, either consciously or by trial and error. One and the same cause can 
have opposing tendencies – both to enhance an effect and to retard it. In any case, where 
these tendencies just balance out, we will see no increase in the probability of the effect 
on the cause. Consider, for instance, a certain brand of non-drowsy decongestant: it does 
not put you to sleep. Nevertheless the patented chemical in it is a powerful soporific. The 
decongestant does not induce drowsiness because the chemical is always packaged with 
an equally potent stimulant.16 
 
For cases like this where there is no change in the probability of the effect whether the 
cause is present or not, it may nevertheless be extremely useful to know the specific 
causal facts. Armed with the information about the Janus-faced nature of a cause, we 
may, for instance, be able to place some block in one of its pathways and thus be left with 
only the result of the tendency in the other direction. 
 
                                                 
15 Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, A Study in the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. 1993, 
Madison, CT: International Universities Press, Inc., p.242. 
16 Thanks to Lisa Lloyd for this example. 
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Those who deny that Simpson’s paradox situations ever occur generally also deny that 
cancellations of opposing tendencies will ever lead to equality of the conditional 
probabilities. The primary argument is the theorem as before: the numbers that afford 
exact cancellation form a set of measure zero. Again, this argument seems both invalid 
and unsound. Exact cancellations are often just what we try to achieve. For the 
decongestants, for example, they are supposed merely to decongest – they are supposed 
neither to put one to sleep nor to stimulate one. So exact cancellation matters.   
 
Economic methodologist Kevin Hoover also takes this kind of cancellation to be 
common:  
 
Spirtes et al. (1993, p.95) acknowledge the possibility that particular parameter 
values might result in [exact cancellation], but they dismiss their importance as 
having “measure zero”. But this will not do for macroeconomics. It fails to 
account for the fact that in macroeconomic and other control contexts, the 
policymaker aims to set parameter values in just such a way to make this 
supposedly measure-zero situation occur. To the degree that policy is successful, 
such situations are common, not infinitely rare.17 
 
It would also be a mistake to put too much emphasis on questions of whether exact 
cancellations occur regularly or not for a reason central to the genuine practical 
considerations that underwrite Grunbaums’s concerns about psychoanalytic claims. We 
are not primarily concerned with pure abstract philosophy – is increase of probability a 
necessary condition for causality or not? Rather we are interested in real methodologies 
that can be used to give reasonable confidence in claims that support often costly 
strategies for relief from very severe problems. 
 
Our tools of statistical estimation are never, even in principle, good enough to settle a 
claim about exact equality of conditional probabilities. I think we have good empirical 
evidence that both near-Simpson’s paradox situations and near-cancellations occur 
regularly and we know that our best methods will frequently estimate conditional 
probabilities as equal. If we adopt increase in probability as a necessary condition for a 
generic causal relation, we will give wrong verdicts about these. And this really matters 
because in both cases there may be large numbers of individuals for whom the cause has 
a profound effect. 
 
This is my case against increase in probability as a necessary condition for Generic level 
causation. Perhaps, however, Grunbaum might want to use it directly as a test for singular 
causation. Maybe not though. I myself have never been comfortable with talk of single-
case probabilities – and I think I learned this suspicion from Grunbaum himself! They at 
any rate just push the problem back a step – how for the single case can we establish 
probability claims in a psychoanalytic setting?   
 
Also I suspect we would frequently get the wrong verdicts. Consider one of those cases 
of opposing tendencies that cancel, where the cancellation in probabilities takes place not 
                                                 
17 K Hoover, Causality in Macroeconomics, 2001,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.17. 
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because different members of the population experience opposing outcomes but rather 
because the opposing tendencies balance out in each individual. Gerhard Hesslow’s 
example of birth control pills and thrombosis is, I believe, supposed to work like this.18 
The pills cause thrombosis; they also prevent pregnancy, which itself is a cause of 
thrombosis. If the two tendencies cancel for an individual, say me, then I suppose we 
might find, for single case probabilities, P(N gets thrombosis/N takes pills) = P(N gets 
thrombosis/ N does not take pills). Still we would want to know both causal facts because 
we may be able to find a way to block the deleterious pathway and leave me with only 
the beneficial effects (thereby changing the conditional probabilities). 
 
The more usual way to use probabilities to treat singe cases is in a two-step process. We 
use the probabilities to establish generic causal claims, then – like Donald Davidson – we 
insist that all admissible singular claims fall under a generic law. So i) if we take increase 
in probability as a necessary condition for a generic causal truth, “C’s cause E’s” and ii) 
we take as a necessary condition for “this C caused this E” that it be generically true that 
C’s cause E’s, then we would have as a result that increase in probability of E on C is a 
necessary condition for the related singular causal claim. I have already explained why I 
do not accept the first step. I am also suspicious of the second, whether or not we accept 
the first. I particularly worry about the second in medical and psychiatric settings of the 
kind that Grunbaum is concerned with. 
 
Let us begin anecdotally. I offer Emily a regime of diet to lose weight. She says, “That 
kind of crash diet never works.” I reply, “It works for me.” And I do so with good reason. 
I am fairly careful about these matters. I have tried this diet frequently. It always works. I 
know about the possibility of spontaneous weight loss and about the placebo effect, about 
long-term vs short-term outcomes, etc. and I have evidence these are not a problem. Now 
there may be some description, D, of me that fixes in a law-like way the efficacy of this 
diet for people who satisfy D. In that case we would have a reference class, picked out in 
a non question-begging way, in which P(weight loss/diet) > P(weight loss/no diet). But 
there may not be such a description. There may simply be individual variation. To insist 
that there is always such a description is to let a big – and insecure – metaphysical 
assumption guide our methodology. That I think is a wrong thing to do. 
 
It is however widely assumed. For instance consider Hersen and Barlow’s text, still in 
use, Single Case Experimental Designs. Here they endorse this view, citing in turn the 
earlier text of M. Sidman on experimental data in psychology: 
 
Physics assumes that variability is imposed by error of measurement or other 
identifiable factors. Experimental efforts are then directed to discovering and 
eliminating as many sources of variability as possible […] Sidman proposes that 
basic researches in psychology adopt this strategy. Rather than assuming that 
variability is intrinsic to the organism, one should make every effort to discover 
sources of behavioral variability among organisms […]19 
                                                 
18 “Discussion: Two Notes on the Probabilistic Theory of Causality,” Philosophy of Science, 43 (2), 1976, p 
290-2.  
19 M Hersen and DH Barlow, Single-Case Experimental Designs, 1981, Oxford: Pergamon Press, p 35. 
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Here of course we do not see the strong metaphysical position – variability is impossible, 
but merely a methodological injunction. But we need to be cautious even about 
methodological injunctions. We want to look for sources of variations because that 
knowledge could be powerful. But every hunt is costly, especially if we do not have good 
starting ideas of where to look. And in the case of human beings – who are not after all 
electrons – we cannot rule out the possibility of intrinsic variability. So we may be 
hunting for what in fact can never be found. In cases like this, we need to weigh the costs 
and the benefits, the probabilities of success and the probabilities of failure from 
following the advice. 
 
The question is a live one, particularly now regarding pharmaceuticals. Some drugs may 
work very well for some people but for others may worsen the very condition they are 
supposed to treat. Ideally we would like a testable description for those in the two 
categories; and we would like to ensure that within these two categories, the treatment 
passes all the tests for generic-level causes. But such testable descriptions are often not 
available, and we must even leave open the possibility that they simply do not exist. The 
good news is that sometimes the bad effects set in gradually and in some known pattern 
so that patients can be monitored and taken off the treatment if it is proving harmful. 
 
One possible example that has recently received notoriety is Prozac, which is used to 
treat depressives. It seems, however, sometimes to induce akathesia, a kind of 
restlessness that can lead to suicide or even the killing of others. So far nobody knows 
how to predict who will fall in the category where Prozac increase the chance of suicide 
(or even if there is such a proper category). The controversy has arisen in part because 
many previous anti-depressants were recommended to be taken with tranquilizers; this 
was not so for Prozac – except in Germany; and now there is the suspicion that a number 
of people have killed themselves and others on account of taking the anti-depressant 
intended, inter alia, to prevent suicide. 
 
There is a mire of legal, social, medical, moral and methodological problems here. It is 
commonplace that standard clinical trial procedures, even when the trial population is 
large and compliant, do not tell us when treatments have opposing effects. I have not 
found anything yet in Grunbaum’s own writing that looks at the methodology in cases 
like this. One hope I have in raising these issues is that we can encourage him to turn to 
this tangle of problems to help sort them out, as he has so many other issues of 
importance to human welfare. 
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